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MIXED SIGNALS: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM THE 
SUPREME COURT IN THIS POST-ADA  
AMENDMENTS ACT ERA? 
Nicole Buonocore Porter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA) was intended to breathe new life into the ADA after the 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, drastically narrowed the ADA’s 
protected class.  But since the ADA was amended in 2008, the 
Supreme Court has not decided any ADA cases.  Thus, there are many 
ADA issues, especially in the employment context, that remain 
unresolved.  This paper will attempt to determine whether we can 
expect a disability-friendly Supreme Court or whether the Court will 
once again narrowly construe individuals with disabilities’ rights under 
the ADA.  
In doing so, I have uncovered some mixed signals.  On the one 
hand, the body of Tenth Circuit ADA cases decided by our newest1 
jurist, Justice Gorsuch, suggests an anti-disability bent.  On the other 
hand, one possible source of good news for individuals with 
disabilities are two disability law cases decided by the Supreme Court 
in 2017: Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools and Endrew F. ex rel. 
Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1.  Both of these cases 
were very plaintiff-friendly and both were unanimous judgments (the 
Fry case had a two-justice concurring opinion).  But are these plaintiff-
friendly cases signaling a pro-disability Supreme Court?  Or is the 
plaintiff-friendly outcome of these cases because they involve 
educating children?  And if the latter is true, what can we expect from 
 
* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development and Professor of Law, University of 
Toledo College of Law. 
1 Since the time this paper was drafted, Brett Kavanaugh was appointed to the Supreme 
Court.  However, this paper does not analyze his disability law jurisprudence.  
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the Supreme Court if and when it decides the unresolved ADA 
employment issues?  This paper will attempt to answer these questions.  
Part II will discuss the tumultuous history of the ADA 
including: a brief description of the ADA, the courts’ narrow 
interpretation of the definition of “disability” under the ADA, 
Congress’s expanded definition of disability under the ADA 
Amendments Act, and the unresolved ADA issues that might find their 
way to the Supreme Court in the near future.  Part III will discuss the 
mixed signals regarding how the Supreme Court might decide these 
unresolved ADA issues, starting with the negative signal—Justice 
Gorsuch’s disability law cases while he was sitting on the Tenth 
Circuit, before turning to the positive signal—the Supreme Court’s 
plaintiff-friendly disability cases in 2017.  Part IV will then 
hypothesize about what, if anything, these mixed signals mean for the 
future of ADA employment cases that could reach the Supreme Court 
in the near future.  
II. TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF THE ADA 
A. The Early Days 
The ADA was enacted in 1990, with overwhelming bipartisan 
support.2  The ADA has several titles.  Title I covers discrimination in 
employment by all employers who have 15 or more employees.3  Title 
II covers governmental services and benefits, including accessibility 
of government-funded buildings.4  Title III addresses access to places 
of public accommodation—private businesses that are open to the 
public, regardless of size.5  Most of the litigation occurs under Title I, 
the employment discrimination title.  
Title I prohibits employers from discriminating against 
qualified individuals with disabilities.6  There are two features of Title 
I that set it apart from other employment discrimination statutes 
(specifically, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits 
 
2 Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Assessing the Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2018) (defining employer to include entities that have 15 or 
more employees).  
4 Id. § 12131. 
5 Id. §§ 12181-12182.  
6 Id. § 12112.  
2
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discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, and national origin7).  
First, only individuals with disabilities are protected.8  Unlike Title 
VII, which protects employees regardless of their protected class, there 
is no “reverse” discrimination under the ADA.9  Thus, plaintiffs have 
to prove they fall into the protected class, i.e., that they have a disability 
as defined in the statute.  The second major difference10 is that the 
ADA reaches beyond simply prohibiting discrimination based on a 
disability.  It imposes an affirmative obligation on employers to 
reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities unless doing so 
would cause an undue hardship.11 
It was the first difference—that only those individuals who can 
meet the definition of disability can bring a claim under the ADA—
that dominated the case law after the ADA was passed.  Specifically, 
in a series of four decisions, the Supreme Court decimated the scope 
of the Act’s coverage, drastically limiting the number of individuals 
who could qualify as disabled.  Disability is defined in the ADA as a 
“physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities.”12  In what is known as the Sutton trilogy, the 
Supreme Court held that, in determining whether an individual has a 
disability, courts should view that person considering any mitigating 
measures that ameliorate the effects of the disability.13  Under the facts 
 
7 Id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.  
8 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining disability). 
9 Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments Act, 43 
PEPP. L. REV. 213, 219 (2016).  
10 Id. at 219.  There is a narrow accommodation obligation for religious practices, but the 
burden on employers is pretty minor.  Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating Everyone, 
47 SETON HALL L. REV. 85, 89 (2016) (citing to the statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(j), 
that requires accommodations for religious beliefs, as well as the standard announced by the 
Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977), which only 
requires employers to provide accommodations for religious beliefs or practices if those 
accommodations do not result in an undue hardship, which the Court defined as anything more 
than a de minimis expense).  
11 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (defining discrimination to include “not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability . . . unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the 
accommodation can impose an undue hardship”).  
12 Id. § 12102(1).  
13 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (holding that fully correctable 
myopia is not a disability); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 519-21 (1999) 
(holding that high blood pressure controlled my medication is not a disability); Albertson’s, 
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 558 (1999) (holding that the lower courts should have 
considered the plaintiff’s brain’s coping mechanisms as a way of compensating for his 
monocular vision in determining whether monocular vision is a disability); see also Nicole 
3
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of Sutton, this did not seem very controversial because the Sutton 
plaintiffs had fully-correctable myopia, so their impairment was not at 
all stigmatizing, and was also very common.14  But this “mitigating 
measures” rule led many courts to hold that impairments that many 
would consider disabilities do not fall into the protected class.15 
The Supreme Court’s final blow to the ADA’s definition of 
disability was in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams.16  In this case, the Court held that, in determining whether 
an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity, the 
impairment must “prevent or severely restrict” the individual from 
performing a major life activity, and only major life activities that are 
of “central importance to daily life” are included.17  The Court also 
held that the impairment must be permanent or long-term.18  This case 
caused many individuals to be excluded from the protected class under 
the ADA,19 leading many scholars to claim that the courts were 
engaging in a “backlash” against the ADA.20  
B. The ADA Amendments Act 
Congress was unhappy with this dramatically narrowed 
definition of disability and therefore passed the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008.21  This Act (hereinafter the “Amendments” or the 
“ADAAA”) did not change the definition of disability but added in 
several provisions to help courts correctly interpret the definition.22  
 
Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2014) [hereinafter 
“Porter, Backlash”] (discussing these cases).  
14 See Stephen F. Befort, The Story of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: Narrowing the Reach 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES (Joel Wm. 
Friedman ed., 2006).  
15 Long, supra note 2, at 220 (stating that as a result of the mitigating measures rule, many 
individuals have been found not disabled under the ADA).  
16 534 U.S. 184 (2002).  
17 Id. at 196-97.  
18 Id. at 198.  
19 Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 11.  
20 Id. at 13-14.  See generally RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST 
DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2005); Matthew Diller, Judicial 
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model of Disability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA 
62-97 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2006); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING 
INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT (2005).  
21 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2018); Porter, Backlash, supra 
note 13, at 14-15.  
22 Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 15.  
4
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First, the ADAAA changed the mitigating measures rule from 
the Sutton trilogy.  The statute now states: “The determination of 
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall 
be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating 
measures . . . .”23  Second, the Court expanded the definition of “major 
life activities” and placed the definition in the statute itself, rather than 
leave it to the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (hereinafter “EEOC”) to define major life activity, as had 
been the case under the original ADA.  The major life activity 
provision (with additions from the EEOC’s prior definition in italics) 
now states:  
[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, 
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, 
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, 
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, 
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 
working.24 
Congress also defined major life activities to include the operation of 
“major bodily functions,” such as “functions of the immune system, 
normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, 
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”25  
Third, Congress did not define “substantially limits” but 
instead left it to the EEOC to define, and stated that the EEOC’s 
definition should “be interpreted consistently with the findings and 
purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.”26  In 2011, the EEOC 
issued regulations stating that “substantially limits” should be 
construed “broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum 
extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.”  Furthermore, it is not 
meant to be a “demanding standard.”27 
Fourth, the Amendments state that an impairment that is 
episodic or in remission should be considered a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active.28  This provision, 
in combination with the addition of “major bodily functions,” means 
 
23 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i).  
24 Id. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
25 Id. § 12102(2)(B).  
26 Id. § 12102(4)(B).  
27 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2018).  
28 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).  
5
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that diseases like cancer, multiple sclerosis, or epilepsy will be 
considered disabilities even if they are in remission or even if the 
individual is not currently experiencing symptoms from the 
impairment.29   
Early research seems to demonstrate that courts are heeding 
Congress’s wish to interpret the definition of disability broadly.30  
C. Unresolved Issues 
Despite the fact that more cases are proceeding past the 
coverage inquiry (whether the individual has a disability) and 
proceeding to the merits of the case, the Supreme Court has not granted 
certiorari on an ADA Title I case since the Amendments went into 
effect (on January 1, 2009).  Thus, there are several outstanding issues 
that the Supreme Court will possibly resolve in the future.  
First, the correct causation standard under the ADA is 
undecided.  In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to make clear that an 
individual only has to demonstrate that his protected class status was a 
“motivating factor” in the employer’s decision, even if other factors 
also motivated the employer.31  Many courts applied that “motivating 
factor” standard to ADA cases after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, even 
though Congress did not specifically amend the ADA with the 
“motivating factor” standard.32  But in 2009, the Court held that, under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter “ADEA”), the 
“motivating factor” standard does not apply.33  Instead, plaintiffs in an 
ADEA case have to prove that their age was the “but-for” cause of the 
adverse employment action.34  In 2013, the Court also held that 
retaliation cases brought under Title VII (as compared to status-based 
 
29 Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 17.  
30 See Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 46-47; Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical 
Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2027, 2050-51 (2013).  
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).  
32 See, e.g., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000); Baird v. 
Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999); Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 
1033-34 (7th Cir. 1999); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 
1996); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996); Buchanan v. City of San 
Antonio, 85 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 
(8th Cir. 1995).  
33 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).  
34 Id. at 176.  
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discrimination cases) also have to meet the more stringent “but-for” 
causation standard and not the easier “motivating factor” standard.35 
After Gross and Nassar, the lower courts began holding that 
the proper causation standard under the ADA is the “but-for” causation 
standard rather than the more lenient “motivating factor” standard.36  
The Supreme Court has not resolved this issue.  
Second, there is a current circuit split regarding whether an 
employer must offer reassignment as a reasonable accommodation to 
an employee with a disability if there are other, more qualified 
employees who also applied for the job.  This is a different issue from 
the one that arose in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,37 where the Court 
had to decide whether reassignment to a vacant position should be 
granted as an accommodation for an individual with a disability when 
a more senior employee had also applied for the vacant position under 
a formal seniority system.38  The Court in Barnett held that, ordinarily, 
the seniority system should trump, in part based on the legitimate 
expectations of non-disabled employees to be treated fairly and 
consistently pursuant to the seniority system.39  
Courts diverge on the issue of whether Barnett mandates that 
an employer reassign a disabled employee over another, more qualified 
employee.  The Eighth Circuit in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.40 held 
that giving the accommodation to the employee with a disability 
instead of the more qualified non-disabled employee would amount to 
“affirmative action with a vengeance” and therefore does not have to 
be granted.  In other words, the employer is only required to allow the 
disabled employee to compete for the position along with everyone 
else.41  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, but the 
parties settled before the case was heard, so the case was dismissed.  
 
35 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).  
36 See, e.g., Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 233-36 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(holding, in reliance on Gross, ADA discrimination claims require a showing of but-for 
causation); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying 
but-for causation standard to ADA claim); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 
957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (same).   
37 535 U.S. 391 (2002).  
38 Id. at 403-04. 
39 Id. at 405-06. 
40 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007). 
41 Id. at 483-84; see also United States EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 842 F.3d 1333, 
1345-47 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the ADA does not require reassignment over a more 
qualified coworker).   
7
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On the other side are courts which hold that only allowing the 
employee with a disability to compete for a vacant position is not an 
accommodation at all, because the ADA’s non-discrimination 
provision already requires that employers allow individuals with 
disabilities to compete on an even playing field with non-disabled 
coworkers.42  Most recently, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Barnett 
by noting that, with a seniority system, coworkers have the expectation 
of receiving fair and uniform treatment under the seniority system.  But 
under a most-qualified policy, employees do not have an expectation 
of being placed in the position, because those decisions are 
discretionary unlike the mostly mechanical seniority system 
decisions.43  Because the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue 
once, I expect they will again if the right case comes before them.  
There is also a circuit split regarding whether Title II of the 
ADA applies to employment discrimination cases brought against 
governmental entities.  For instance, in Elwell v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,44 the Tenth Circuit 
(in an opinion authored by then-Judge Gorsuch) held that plaintiffs 
cannot bring employment discrimination claims under Title II of the 
ADA; Title I is their only avenue of relief.45  The Seventh Circuit is in 
agreement.46 
Much earlier, in Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water 
Conservation District, the Eleventh Circuit held otherwise, relying on 
the legislative history surrounding Title II and the Department of 
Justice’s regulations, which specifically state that Title II covers 
discrimination in employment and that courts should use the same 
rules and standards as Title I of the ADA.47  
One of the most commonly litigated issues under the ADA is 
whether the employer has to grant a leave of absence as a reasonable 
accommodation, and if so, under what circumstances.48  The Court 
 
42 See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Aka 
v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).  
43 EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2012).  
44 693 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2012).  
45 Id. at 1305; see also infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing this opinion). 
46 See Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2013).  So is the Ninth 
Circuit.  See Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999).  
47 133 F.3d 816, 821-25 (11th Cir. 1998).  See also Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 
50 F.3d 1261, 1264 (4th Cir. 1995) (implicitly assuming plaintiff could sue for employment 
discrimination under Title II).  
48 See Lawrence P. Postol, ADA Open Issues: Transfers to Vacant Positions, Leaves of 
Absence, Telecommuting, and Other Accommodation Issues, 8 ELON L. REV. 61, 62-63 (2016) 
8
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recently denied certiorari on this issue,49 but I don’t think that can 
necessarily be read as suggesting that they would never grant certiorari 
to resolve this debate. 
There is also a circuit split on the issue of whether courts should 
grant compensatory and punitive damages under ADA retaliation 
cases (as compared to ADA discrimination cases).50  
Finally, although not a formal circuit split, there is a debate 
about how courts should address intra-class discrimination issues.  For 
instance, if an employee with bipolar disorder is passed up for a 
promotion in favor of an employee who uses a wheelchair, can the 
employee with bipolar disorder sue for disability discrimination?  And 
more broadly, how should courts decide these issues of intra-class 
discrimination.51  
This is not necessarily an exhaustive list but merely an attempt 
to highlight some of the most obvious issues that I believe the Court 
could and perhaps will address in the near to mid-term future.  A 
completely separate question, to which I turn next, is how the current 
Court will decide these issues.  To answer this, we need to explore 
some mixed signals.  
 
(stating that the issue of when and under what circumstances an employer has to provide a 
leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation is an open issue under the ADA).  See 
generally Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: 
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439 (2002).  
49 See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 481-82 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding 
that a long-term leave of absence is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1441 (2018). 
50 Compare Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that compensatory and punitive damages are not available for ADA retaliation cases), 
Bowles v. Carolina Cargo, Inc., 100 F. App’x 889, 890 (4th Cir. 2004) (same), Kramer v. Banc 
of Am. Sec., LLC, 355 F.3d 961, 963 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 932 (2004) (same), 
and Collazo-Rosado v. Univ. of P.R., 775 F. Supp. 2d 376, 388 (D.P.R. 2011) (same), with 
Foster v. Time Warner Entertm’t Co., 250 F.3d 1189, 1196-98 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming 
award of compensatory damages in an ADA retaliation case without a thorough discussion), 
Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 315 (2d Cir. 1999) (same), EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
187 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 1999) (same), Edwards v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 390 
F. Supp. 2d 225, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that compensatory and punitive damages are 
available for ADA retaliation cases). 
51 See generally Jeannette Cox, Disability Stigma and Intraclass Discrimination, 62 FLA. 
L. REV. 429 (2010) (discussing various issues of intra-class discrimination); Nicole Buonocore 
Porter, Cumulative Hardship, G. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing how courts 
should address intra-class discrimination issues).  
9
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III. MIXED SIGNALS 
This Part will first address what I consider to be the negative 
signal—specifically, the fact that Justice Gorsuch authored several 
anti-disability rights cases while on the Tenth Circuit.  I will then turn 
to the positive signal, which is that the 2017 Court decided two 
plaintiff-friendly disability cases, albeit in the education context rather 
than the employment context.  
A. Justice Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit Opinions 
I will address then-Judge Gorsuch’s disability opinions while 
on the Tenth Circuit in chronological order.  The first is Johnson v. 
Weld County, Colorado,52 where the court addressed the issue of 
whether the plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis was a disability under the pre-
Amendments ADA.53  The plaintiff was an accountant who had 
multiple sclerosis.54  She was temporarily placed into the position of 
Fiscal Officer while the employer was preparing to hire a permanent 
replacement.55  When the employer finally began hiring for a 
permanent fiscal officer, the plaintiff applied, along with other 
employees.56  Ultimately, the employer hired a non-disabled man for 
the job.57  When the male employee was hired, the plaintiff was tasked 
with training him.58  She complained to human resources about this, 
which subsequently led to her experiencing retaliation.59  She 
eventually brought a lawsuit that included several claims, but for 
purposes of this paper, I will only address the disability claim.  
This case applied pre-ADAAA law regarding the definition of 
disability because the Amendments did not apply retroactively and the 
facts of this case occurred in 2005,60 several years before the ADAAA 
became effective.  The plaintiff argued that her multiple sclerosis 
 
52 594 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2010).  
53 Id. at 1206-07.  The case also dealt with a sex discrimination issue but that will not be 
discussed here.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1207.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
10
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substantially limited her in the major life activity of working.61  But 
because the evidence suggested that she was a “highly competent 
employee” and had “excellent performance reviews,” the court held 
that she was not substantially limited in working.62  The court 
recognized that it is likely that her multiple sclerosis would progress to 
the point where it would interfere with her ability to work, but it had 
not yet.63  Thus, the court used the evidence the plaintiff had introduced 
to help buttress her claim that she should have received the promotion 
instead of the able-bodied man it hired, in order to hold that she was 
not disabled, and therefore did not fall into the protection of the ADA 
at all.64  Even if she had been in possession of convincing evidence that 
the employer did not want to hire her for the job because it worried 
about her being too disabled in the future to perform the job well or 
because it did not want to provide her any accommodations that she 
might have needed in the future, the court would not have considered 
that evidence because it held that she did not even fall into the 
protected class.65  
The court also dismissed plaintiff’s claim that she was disabled 
under a “regarded as” argument—that the employer regarded her as 
being substantially limited in a major life activity.66  Her evidence was 
that she was told that the decision maker “didn’t hire her as Fiscal 
Officer because she was a woman and had multiple sclerosis, and so, 
in his view, she couldn’t handle the stress of the position.”67  The court 
refused to consider this argument because it was “inadmissible 
hearsay.”68  
The next case that then-Judge Gorsuch authored was Elwell v. 
Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.69  
This case addressed the issue of whether state employees can bring 
employment discrimination claims against their state employers under 
 
61 Id. at 1218.  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 I do not mean to suggest that this move is unique to this case.  Several courts in the pre-
Amendments era held that plaintiffs were not disabled and therefore did not fall into the 
protected class without ever reaching the merits of their cases.  Porter, Backlash, supra note 
13, at 11-12.   
66 Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1219.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 693 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2012).  
11
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Title II of the ADA (which applies to government services) or whether 
their only avenue of relief is under Title I.70  Taking a methodical 
approach through the statutory text of Title II, including the catch-all 
language contained in the main anti-discrimination section of Title 
II—“or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity”—the court 
found that Title II was not intended to apply to employment 
discrimination claims.71  
This holding might not seem very important given the 
protection of Title I for employment discrimination claims.  However, 
Title I has administrative exhaustion requirements, and more 
importantly, the Supreme Court has held that states enjoy Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit under Title I, which represents an 
obstacle for state employees trying to bring employment 
discrimination claims.72  As I mentioned earlier, this is one of those 
issues for which the circuits are split.  It seems likely to me that, if this 
issue were decided by the Supreme Court, not only can we predict how 
Justice Gorsuch would rule on it, but the fact that he authored one of 
the circuit’s opinions leads me to suspect that he might be able to 
persuade other justices to side with him on this issue. 
Perhaps the most troubling of Judge Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit 
disability cases is Hwang v. Kansas State University,73 where the court 
had to deal with the issue of when a leave of absence is a reasonable 
accommodation.74  This case was brought under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, rather than the ADA, but in most circumstances, 
courts interpret the statutes consistently.75  Gorsuch started the opinion 
appearing sympathetic, noting that “Grace Hwang was a good teacher 
suffering a wretched year.”76  She was a college professor who was 
diagnosed with cancer and needed treatment.  She was given a six-
month leave of absence, but when that leave ended and her doctor 
advised that she was not capable of returning, she asked for more time 
off.77  The university responded that it had a strict policy of not 
 
70 Id. at 1305.  
71 Id. at 1307-10.  
72 Id. at 1310 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001)).  
73 753 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2014).  
74 Id. at 1161 (“Must an employer allow employees more than six months’ sick leave or 
face liability under the Rehabilitation Act?  Unsurprisingly, the answer is almost always no.”).  
75 See, e.g., Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 133 (D. Mass. 1997). 
76 Hwang, 753 F.3d at 1161.  
77 Id.  
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allowing more than six months of sick leave, and therefore, it refused 
to give her more leave, effectively resulting in her termination.78  
The court was quick to dismiss the idea that an additional leave 
of absence might be a reasonable accommodation.  In fact, the court 
stated: “It perhaps goes without saying that an employee who isn’t 
capable of working for so long isn’t an employee capable of 
performing a job’s essential functions—and that requiring an employer 
to keep a job open for so long doesn’t qualify as a reasonable 
accommodation.”79  Judge Gorsuch did recognize that sometimes an 
employee who needs a “brief” absence can “still discharge the essential 
functions of her job” or that “allowing such a brief absence may 
sometimes amount to a (legally required) reasonable accommodation 
so that the employee can proceed to discharge her essential job 
duties.”80  But then the court stated that “it’s difficult to conceive how 
an employee’s absence for six months—an absence in which she could 
not work from home, part-time, or in any way in any place—could be 
consistent with discharging the essential functions of most any job in 
the national economy today.”81 
The court refused to rely on the EEOC enforcement guidance, 
which states that employers should provide employees with additional 
unpaid leave unless doing so would cause an undue hardship.82  The 
court misinterpreted the EEOC Guidance83 and then stated that there is 
no evidence that the employer’s inflexible policy in this case was 
discriminatory.84  
The next ADA employment case then-Judge Gorsuch authored 
was Myers v. Knight Protective Service, Inc.85  In this case, the 
plaintiff, at a place of prior employment, had suffered a workplace 
injury and obtained social security disability benefits as a result.86  
Around the same time, the plaintiff applied for a job as an armed 
 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).  
80 Id. at 1162. 
81 Id. (stating “[e]ven if it were, it is difficult to conceive when requiring so much latitude 
from an employer might qualify as a reasonable accommodation.” (emphasis in original)).  
82 Id. at 1162-63.  
83 Id. at 1163 (stating that the EEOC Guidance does not answer the question of when a leave 
of absence would be reasonable and only applies after a court determines that additional leave 
would be reasonable).  
84 Id. at 1164.  
85 774 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2014). 
86 Id. at 1248.  
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security guard with Knight Protective Service.87  As part of that 
application, he was asked several questions about his physical 
condition and he alleged that he suffered no relevant disabilities.88  
Soon after, one of his supervisors noticed that plaintiff seemed to be in 
pain, and upon questioning, plaintiff admitted that he had a number of 
neck and back surgeries and that he experienced recurring pain.  As a 
result, plaintiff was told that he could not work without passing a 
physical examination.  Plaintiff waited for the employer to schedule 
the exam, and when that did not occur, he believed he was terminated 
and he filed suit.89  The district court dismissed all of his claims.90  
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal stating that the 
plaintiff was not qualified for his position.91  The court gave deference 
to the employer’s written employment application, which indicated 
that the essential functions of the job as a security guard were to engage 
in “frequent and prolonged walking, standing, and sitting; to react 
quickly to dangerous situations; to subdue violent individuals; and to 
lift heavy weights.”92  The court found that the plaintiff was not 
qualified to perform these functions in large part because in his 
representations to the Social Security Administration, the plaintiff 
conceded that he was “in pain all the time, could stand for only twenty 
minutes, and could walk for just ten or fifteen minutes.”93  The Tenth 
Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had previously held in 
Cleveland v. Policy Management System Corp.94 that when a plaintiff 
makes seemingly inconsistent statements in proceedings before the 
Social Security Administration and in the ADA lawsuit, that the 
plaintiff should be given an opportunity to provide a sufficient 
explanation for the apparent contradiction.95  In one sentence, without 
elaboration (despite the fact that this is a published opinion), the court 
stated: “That [(providing the explanation)] Mr. Myers has failed to 
do.”96  
 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 1248-49.  
93 Id. at 1249.  
94 526 U.S. 795 (1999).  
95 Myers, 774 F.3d at 1249 (citing Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805).  
96 Id. at 1249.  
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Without knowing more about the job or what the plaintiff 
alleged in his briefs to the court, it is unclear to me whether the plaintiff 
attempted to offer an explanation for the apparent inconsistency.  Most 
often, the explanation turns on whether there are reasonable 
accommodations that would allow the plaintiff to perform the job.  I, 
of course, do not know much about the duties of a security guard, but 
one relevant question would be whether the plaintiff could successfully 
perform the job if accommodated.  Possible questions for determining 
if he could have been reasonably accommodated might include: 
whether the plaintiff worked with another security guard; if so, 
whether that other security guard could assist if the plaintiff needed to 
apprehend someone; whether it would be possible for the plaintiff to 
sit on a stool for part of his shift; and whether it would be possible to 
structure the “rounds” a security guard makes so as to minimize the 
amount of walking he would have to do.  I have no idea whether any 
of these would be feasible, but in my limited experience with security 
guards, their main function is often meant to be one of deterrence and 
observation, rather than actually chasing or apprehending anyone.  
Some of the accommodations I have suggested might have allowed 
him to perform his job successfully.  Certainly, it is possible that both 
the district court and the Tenth Circuit considered these possible 
accommodations.  If so, it would have been helpful to include this 
discussion so that the wisdom and precedential value of the case could 
be analyzed.  Without it, I find problematic the court’s failure to 
explore whether accommodations would have allowed him to perform 
his job successfully.  
The final disability employment case authored by then-Judge 
Gorsuch was Lancaster v. Sprint/United Management Co., which is an 
unpublished opinion.97  Without any details being provided about the 
facts of the case, the court noted that the district court had initially 
entered a default judgment on the plaintiff’s behalf because the 
employer did not respond to her complaint in a timely manner.98  
However, this default judgment was vacated because the plaintiff 
failed to meet her burden of showing that she had served process on 
Sprint’s authorized agent.99  In addressing her ADA failure-to-
accommodate claim on the merits, the Tenth Circuit stated that she was 
not entitled to a reasonable accommodation because the only 
 
97 670 F. App’x 984 (10th Cir. 2016).  
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
15
Buonocore Porter: Mixed Signals and the ADA
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019
450 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
accommodation that she sought was “an extended, indeterminate leave 
of absence,” which the court held was not a reasonable accommodation 
as a matter of law.100  
Even though I have only covered the opinions that were 
employment cases, I was unable to find any disability-related opinions 
that then-Judge Gorsuch authored that were decided in the plaintiff’s 
favor.101  This alone does not bode well for plaintiffs in disability cases.  
But more importantly, Justice Gorsuch has issued opinions against 
plaintiffs in two of the circuit splits I identified above; whether 
plaintiffs can bring employment discrimination claims under Title II 
and whether leaves of absence are reasonable accommodations under 
the ADA.  
Moreover, in his apparent desire to be brief and pithy, his 
opinions leave the reader wanting more explanation regarding the facts 
and the court’s reasoning.  It is almost impossible to ascertain any of 
the relevant facts from reading his opinions alone.  The reader would 
have to turn to the district court opinions.  Thus, it would be difficult 
to determine whether an opinion would be a relevant precedent for an 
individual case without delving more deeply into the lower court 
opinions.  This will be frustrating to lawyers and researchers.  
B. The Supreme Court’s 2017 Disability Opinions 
The Supreme Court decided two disability-related opinions in 
2017 that are friendly to disability plaintiffs and their interests: Fry v. 
Napoleon Community Schools and Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. 
Douglas County School District RE-1. 
1. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools102 
In Fry, the Court addressed a relatively narrow issue of 
exhaustion of remedies.  Under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (hereinafter “IDEA”),103 public schools have to provide 
a “free appropriate public education” (hereinafter “FAPE”)—which 
consists of special education and related services—to all children with 
 
100 Id.  
101 See, e.g., Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917 
(10th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of claim by a residential treatment facility that denial of 
a variance to allow it to operate in a public motel was not discriminatory).   
102 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017). 
103 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2018). 
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disabilities.104  Because parents and schools sometimes do not agree on 
whether an appropriate education is being provided to a particular 
child, the IDEA establishes formal procedures (a multi-step process) 
for resolving disputes—this process is referred to as “exhausting 
remedies.”105  But the IDEA is not the only federal statute that applies 
to children with disabilities and the schools they attend—plaintiffs can 
also file suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act or 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which both broadly prohibit 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities (children and 
adults) in all kinds of settings, as long as those settings are public 
entities (for purposes of Title II) or a program or activity that receives 
federal financial assistance (for purposes of Section 504).106  These 
statutes require covered entities to provide reasonable modifications to 
existing practices to allow the individual with a disability to participate 
in those programs or activities.107  
The plaintiff in this case, E.F., was a child with a severe form 
of cerebral palsy, affecting her motor skills and mobility.108  Her 
parents, upon the recommendation of her pediatrician, obtained a 
trained service dog for her, a goldendoodle named Wonder, who 
assisted E.F. by helping her with various life activities, including 
“retrieving dropped items, helping her balance when she uses her 
walker, opening and closing doors, turning on and off lights, helping 
her take off her coat, [and] helping her transfer to and from the 
toilet.”109  When the Frys sought permission for Wonder to attend 
kindergarten with E.F., the school refused, arguing that because E.F.’s 
Individualized Education Program (hereinafter “IEP”) provided for a 
human aide and one-on-one support, Wonder was superfluous.110  
Later that year, the school briefly allowed Wonder to attend school 
with E.F., but the dog was required to stay in the back of the classroom 
and could not assist E.F. with many of the tasks he had been 
specifically trained to do.111  The school administrators subsequently 
 
104 Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 748. 
105 Id. at 749.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 750.  
109 Id. at 751 (alteration in original).  
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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barred Wonder completely from the classroom, and the Frys removed 
E.F. from the school and began home-schooling her.112 
The Frys filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (hereinafter “OCR”), arguing that 
the school’s exclusion of Wonder violated E.F.’s rights under Title II 
of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.113  The OCR 
agreed, explaining that a school’s obligation goes beyond providing 
educational services, and includes not discriminating against a child.114  
In response to OCR’s decision, the school agreed to allow Wonder to 
attend school with E.F., but the Frys were worried that the school 
would resent E.F. and decided to find her another school.115  The Frys 
also filed suit in federal court, alleging that the school failed to 
reasonably accommodate E.F.’s use of a service animal.116  The district 
court granted the school district’s motion to dismiss, stating that the 
Frys were required to first exhaust their administrative remedies under 
the IDEA.117  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that because the 
injuries alleged by E.F. are “educational” in nature, the Frys first had 
to exhaust their remedies under the IDEA.118  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.119  
The Court first noted that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that 
the Frys must exhaust remedies under the IDEA if the injury is 
educational in nature.120  Instead, the Court held that the IDEA’s 
exhaustion requirement is only applicable to relief that is available 
under the IDEA and the only relief that can be sought under the IDEA 
is the denial of a FAPE.121  Thus, the exhaustion rule “hinges on 
whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a free appropriate public 
education.”122 
The Court then turned to the next step in the analysis—
determining whether the plaintiff is seeking relief for the denial of a 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 751. 
116 Id. at 751-52.  
117 Id. at 752. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 753.  
121 Id.   
122 Id. at 754.  
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FAPE.123  The Court stated that, in answering this question, the court 
should look at the substance (or “gravamen”) of the complaint.124  The 
exhaustion requirement will apply if the plaintiff’s complaint seeks 
relief for the denial of a FAPE, and in making this determination, 
courts should not simply consider specific terms or labels used by the 
plaintiff; but rather, should look to the substance of the complaint.125   
One clue, according to the Court, for determining whether the 
gravamen of the complaint concerns the denial of a FAPE or instead 
addresses disability-based discrimination is to ask two hypothetical 
questions.126  First, could the plaintiff have brought the same claim if 
the conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school, such 
as a public library?127  Second, could an adult at the school (an 
employee or a visitor) have brought the same claim that the child 
did?128  If the answer to both of these questions is “yes,” then the 
complaint is not alleging a denial of a FAPE.129  Ultimately, the Court 
remanded to the court below to address the proper question—(what is 
the gravamen of E.F.’s suit) which is a different question from the one 
the Sixth Circuit had asked (whether the claim was “educational” in 
nature).130  Despite the remand, the Court strongly suggested that the 
gravamen of the suit was not the denial of a FAPE because the Frys 
have all along admitted that the school district satisfied E.F.’s 
educational needs.131  The Court also noted that the Frys could have 
brought this same suit against another type of governmental entity 
which had refused to admit E.F.’s service dog.132  
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice 
Thomas joined.133  Although the concurring justices agreed with most 
of the opinion, they disagreed with the “clues” offered in the majority 
opinion to help courts decide these cases—specifically whether the 
student could have brought the same suit against another public 
institution and whether an adult could have brought the same claim 
 
123 Id. at 755.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 756. 
127 Id.  
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 756. 
130 Id. at 758.  
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 759. 
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against the school.134  Justice Alito stated that these clues are not 
helpful because the statutes involved have overlapping protections.135 
Although the reach of this opinion is small (because the issue 
was narrow), it is still seen as a pro-plaintiff suit.  E.F. and her parents 
have the right to sue the school district for denying E.F. the right to 
bring Wonder, the service dog, to class.  
2. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas 
County School District RE-1136 
In Endrew F., the Court had to revisit an issue left open from 
1982, when it had first discussed the applicable standard for 
determining what constitutes a “free appropriate public education.”137  
In Rowley, the issue was whether the IDEA’s FAPE requirement 
obligated the school district to provide Amy Rowley with a sign 
language interpreter.138  The Court in Rowley took a middle road in 
determining the standard governing whether a school district has met 
its obligations of providing each student with a disability a FAPE.  The 
Court held that the IDEA “guarantees a substantively adequate 
program of education to all eligible children.”139  This requirement is 
satisfied if the child’s IEP sets out an educational plan that is 
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 
benefits.”140  When a child is receiving her education in the regular 
classroom, a FAPE is being provided if the IEP is “reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance 
from grade to grade.”141  Because Amy Rowley was advancing from 
grade to grade in a regular classroom without the use of the sign 
language interpreter, the Court determined that the school district’s 
obligation to provide a FAPE had been met.142  
The question not answered by the Court in Rowley, however, 
was how courts determine if a FAPE is being provided when the child 
 
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).  
137 Id. at 993.  See also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. 
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).  
138 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994.  
139 Id. at 995 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200-02).  
140 Id. at 996.  
141 Id. (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204).  
142 Id. (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202). 
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is not being educated in the regular classroom.  That issue arose in 
Endrew F.  Endrew F. had autism, which qualifies as a disability under 
the IDEA.143  Endrew attended school in Douglas County School 
District from pre-school through fourth grade.144  Each year, an IEP 
was prepared to address his educational and functional needs.145  In 
fourth grade, his parents became dissatisfied with Endrew’s 
progress.146  They believed his academic and functional progress had 
stalled.147  His IEP mostly contained the same goals and objectives 
from the prior year, indicating to his parents that he was not making 
meaningful progress towards his goals.148  When the school district 
presented another IEP that Endrew’s parents thought was substantially 
similar to the previous year, they objected, removed him from public 
school, and enrolled him at a private school that specialized in 
educating children with autism.149  Endrew did much better at the 
private school in part because the school developed a behavioral 
intervention plan that identified strategies for addressing his biggest 
problem areas.150  The private school also increased his academic 
goals, and he soon was making academic progress that he had not 
achieved in public school.151 
After six months at the private school, the public school 
presented another IEP to Endrew’s parents but they again rejected it, 
claiming it was too similar to his old IEP despite the fact that his 
experience at the private school suggested that he would benefit from 
a different approach.152  After exhausting their administrative 
remedies, Endrew’s parents sued the school district for failing to 
provide Endrew a FAPE.153  
The Administrative Law Judge who first heard the case denied 
relief.154  The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.155  The district 
 
143 Id.  
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id.  
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 997.  
152 Id. 
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
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court acknowledged that Endrew’s performance “did not reveal 
immense educational growth,” but it concluded that the changes made 
to Endrew’s IEP objectives were “sufficient to show a pattern of, at the 
least, minimal progress” and this was all that was required under the 
standard announced in Rowley.156  
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.157  That circuit had long interpreted 
the language in Rowley requiring “some educational benefit” as 
meaning that an IEP will be considered “adequate as long as it is 
calculated to confer an ‘educational benefit [that is] merely . . . more 
than de minimis.’”158  Under this standard, the Tenth Circuit held that 
Endrew’s IEP was calculated to enable him to make “some progress” 
and therefore, he had not been denied a FAPE.159 
Before the Supreme Court, the school district argued that the 
IEP does not need to provide any particular level of benefits as long as 
it allows the child to achieve some educational benefit.160  The district 
relied on the Rowley Court’s refusal to set any particular standard as 
evidence of its position.161  The Court disagreed, pointing primarily to 
the fact that the Court in Rowley had no need to define the particular 
standard because the case before it involved a child whose progress of 
advancing from grade to grade affirmatively established that the IEP 
was designed to deliver “more than adequate educational benefits.”162  
The Court also noted the inconsistency between the district’s argument 
that the Rowley Court had set a substantive standard that any 
educational benefit was enough when the Rowley Court made clear that 
it was not setting a particular standard for testing the adequacy of the 
educational benefits received.163  
The Court then announced not a precise standard but a general 
approach: “To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a 
school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to 
make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”164  
Although the Court made clear that the question should be whether the 
IEP was reasonable rather than whether it is ideal, it also stated that 
 
156 Id. (citation omitted).  
157 Id.  
158 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 998.  
161 Id.  
162 Id.  
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 999.  
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the “IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress.”165  The Court 
stated that this standard reflects the “broad purpose of the IDEA,” 
which is an “ambitious” piece of legislation.166  And, a “substantive 
standard not focused on student progress would do little to remedy the 
pervasive and tragic academic stagnation that prompted Congress to 
act.”167  
The Court reiterated what it had said in Rowley, that when the 
preference for mainstreaming is met, “the system itself monitors the 
educational progress of the child” by making sure the child is receiving 
“passing marks” and advancing “from grade to grade.”168  But the 
Court had no need in Rowley to opine on what is appropriate progress 
when a child is not reasonably going to be able to achieve grade-level 
advancement.169  For those students, the Court said, the educational 
program “must be appropriately ambitious in light of his 
circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is 
appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom.  
The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet 
challenging objectives.”170 
The Court recognized that this standard is not a “formula” but 
also noted that it is “markedly more demanding” than the “merely more 
than de minimis” standard used by the Tenth Circuit.171  A student 
offered an educational program only aimed at merely more than de 
minimis “progress from year to year can hardly be said to have been 
offered an education at all.”172  The Court came to a unanimous opinion 
in this plaintiff-friendly case. 
IV. FUTURE OF ADA TITLE I CIRCUIT SPLITS? 
After exploring the mixed signals above, the open question is 
what the combination of Justice Gorsuch’s addition to the bench and 
the pro-plaintiff 2017 opinions means for the future of some of the 
 
165 Id.  
166 Id. 
167 Id.  
168 Id. (citation omitted).  
169 Id. at 1000. 
170 Id.  
171 Id. (emphasis in original). 
172 Id. at 1001. 
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ADA issues that might come before the Supreme Court in the near 
future.  
Unfortunately for disability rights advocates, I do not think that 
the picture is rosy.  Despite the pro-plaintiff 2017 opinions, my reading 
of those cases is that they are not pro-disability so much as they are 
pro-education of children.  There is some language in the Fry and 
Endrew F. opinions that emphasizes the importance of children’s 
education.  For instance, at one point in the Endrew F. opinion, the 
Court states that the “focus on the particular child is at the core of the 
IDEA.”173  And the Court in Fry describes the IDEA as “important” 
for children with disabilities.174 
More importantly, these plaintiff-friendly cases are likely not 
indicative of a disability-friendly Supreme Court because they both 
involved questions of statutory interpretation under the IDEA, which 
is a very different statute from the ADA.  
The IDEA provides a substantive mandate for educational 
benefits, whereas the ADA is primarily an anti-discrimination 
statute.175  Even though the ADA requires employers to provide 
reasonable accommodations to individuals with disabilities, courts 
have long been skeptical about the ADA’s accommodation mandate.  
For instance, Judge Posner, in Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department 
of Administration,176 said this about the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation obligation:  
The more problematic case is that of an 
individual who has a vocationally relevant disability—
an impairment such as blindness or paralysis that limits 
a major human capability, such as seeing or walking. In 
the common case in which such an impairment 
interferes with the individual’s ability to perform up to 
the standards of the workplace, or increases the cost of 
employing him, hiring and firing decisions based on the 
impairment are not “discriminatory” in a sense closely 
analogous to employment discrimination on racial 
grounds. The draftsmen of the Act knew this. But they 
 
173 Id. at 999. 
174 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017).  
175 Id. at 756 (“In short, the IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, 
while Title II and § 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] promise non-discriminatory access to 
public institutions.”).  
176 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).  
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were unwilling to confine the concept of disability 
discrimination to cases in which the disability is 
irrelevant to the performance of the disabled person’s 
job. Instead, they defined “discrimination” to include 
an employer’s “not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability who is an applicant or employee . . . .”177 
Compared to what some see as hostility towards the reasonable 
accommodation obligation under the ADA,178 the IDEA’s provision of 
substantive benefits, as part of Congress’s power to legislate under the 
spending power,179 stands on firmer footing.  Because Congress 
provides federal funding in exchange for the states’ agreement to meet 
the provisions of the IDEA,180 the substantive obligation to provide a 
FAPE is very broad.  For instance, in Cedar Rapids Community School 
District v. Garret F.,181 the Court held that the IDEA does not contain 
an “undue burden” exemption even though the costs of the medical 
services needed by a ventilator-dependent student were very high.182  
The Court concluded:  
This case is about whether meaningful access to the 
public schools will be assured, not the level of 
education that a school must finance once access is 
attained. It is undisputed that the services at issue must 
be provided if Garret is to remain in School. Under the 
statute, our precedent, and the purposes of the IDEA, 
the District must fund such “related services” in order 
to help guarantee that students like Garret are integrated 
into the public schools.183 
 
177 Id. at 541-42.  
178 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and 
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (1996) (“Reasonable accommodation is 
affirmative action, in the sense that it requires an employer to take account of an individual’s 
disabilities and to provide special treatment to him for that reason.”).  
179 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 204 n.26 (1982). 
180 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017) (“An eligible child . . . acquires 
a ‘substantive right’ to such an education once a State accepts the IDEA’s financial 
assistance.” (citation omitted)).  
181 526 U.S. 66 (1999).  
182 Id. at 77-78.  
183 Id. at 79.  
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In contrast to the broad interpretation the Court has given to the IDEA, 
it has not interpreted the ADA broadly.184  I think it is unlikely that two 
plaintiff-friendly IDEA cases are going to change the Court’s 
interpretation of disability rights under the ADA. 
Finally, given that disability plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit lost 
in every case penned by then-Judge Gorsuch, his addition to the Court 
is likely bad news for disability rights advocates.  More specifically, 
he has taken employer-friendly positions on two of the issues for which 
there are currently circuit splits—whether a plaintiff can sue for 
employment discrimination under Title II and whether an employer 
has to provide a long-term leave of absence as a reasonable 
accommodation.185   
All of this leads me to believe that if and when any of the circuit 
splits identified above186 are heard by the Supreme Court, they are not 
likely to lead to disability-friendly outcomes.  
 
184 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1999) (holding that 
plaintiffs with fully correctable myopia are not disabled because disability must be determined 
considering any mitigating measures); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 519-20 
(1999) (holding that plaintiff’s hypertension is not a disability because medication helps to 
mitigate it); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (holding that, in 
determining whether plaintiff’s monocular vision is a disability, the court must consider any 
coping techniques the plaintiff’s brain uses to accommodate his vision impairment); Toyota 
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (narrowly interpreting the meaning of 
“substantially limits” and “major life activities”); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 
(2002) (holding that the employer’s seniority system trumps the disabled employee’s right to 
be reassigned to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation).  
185 See Elwell v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303 (10th 
Cir. 2012); Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2014). 
186 See supra Part III.A. 
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